Lattice basis reduction algorithms have contributed a lot to cryptanalysis of RSA crypto system. With coppersmith's theory of polynomials, these algorithms are searching for the weak instances of Number-theoretic cryptography, mainly RSA. In this paper we present several lattice based attacks on low private exponent of RSA.
INTRODUCTION
A normal RSA decryption/signature requires time O(log d N). Selecting a small value for the secret exponent d can significantly increase the speed for the normal RSA decryption process/signature process. However, recent attacks show small private exponents should be handled with care as they may be threaten RSA's security. In this paper we present some lattice based attacks mounted against RSA instances with small secret exponent d. Firstly we present the wiener attack in terms of lattices. The original paper of wiener used continuous fractions to derive the bound 0.25. Next, Boneh improved this bound to 0.292. Initially they solved the problem to 0.284. Later they improved the bound to 0.292, but used complicated techniques called geometrical progressive matrices. Later May used simplified analysis, but they got the bound 0.290, which is worse than the Boneh method, but the analysis is much simpler. 
TERMINOLOGY 2.1 Lattices
A
Lattice reduction
Lattice reduction is a old problem in number theory. Lattice reduction reduced the given lattice into "short" basis. Here "short" in the sense that Euclidean distance. In the literature, so many lattice reduction algorithms exist but the one given by Lenstra, Lenstra, Lovasz is a famous one. Because there exists polynomial time algorithm for this reduction and it solves SVP problem of lattices in some sense.
LLL reduced
The following LLL reduced version given by Lenstra, Lenstra, Lovasz [1] , [2] , [3] . 
RSA Cryptosystem:
The well known RSA cryptosystem was the first publicly known public key cryptosystem introduced by Rivest, Shamir, Adleman [5] . In this paper, we consider only instances of RSA with balanced primes. Balanced primes are the primes which have the same size. Also we assume that ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ . So, if are balanced primes then the following inequality hold:
Resultant of two bivaraite polynomials:
The resultant of two polynomials ( ) and ( )with respect to the variable , is defined as the determinant of Sylvester matrix of ( ) and ( ) when considered as polynomials in the single indeterminate
The resultant is non-zero if and only if the two polynomials are algebraically independent . When the polynomials are algebraically independent, the resultant yields a new polynomial ( ) such that if ( ) is a root of both ( ) and ( ) then ( ) Assumption: We assume that the two polynomials return by LLL algorithm are algebraically independent. There is no theoretical proof for this one, but in practice most of the times achieved.
Howgrave-Graham for Bivariate Integer Polynomials:
Let ( ) be a polynomial in 2 variables with at most w monomials and let m be a positive integer. Suppose in addition that 1) h( ) ( ) where and , and
then ( ) holds over the integers.
WIENER'S ATTACK WITH LATTICES
Wiener proposed the attack [7] on short secret exponent attack using continuous fractions. Later May introduced the same attack using lattice reduction techniques. We present their attack here. ) is a root of polynomial ( ) modulo N. In order to break the instance of RSA we only need to find the small roots of this polynomial modulo N. Typically, this would involve using the heuristic extensions of Coppersmith's methods. That is, using lattice reduction to find two small normed bivariate polynomials that have the root ( ) over the integers. We use LLL algorithm to find lattice reduction for the lattice, constructed from the coefficient vectors of ( ) and ( ) where ( ) . The basis matrix for the lattice is given by . Using the conditions given in the theorem, it follows that
And so the bounds can be defined as and
BONEH AND DURFEE SMALL INVERSE ATTACK
Boneh and durfee attack [8] can recover the primes in polynomial time provided that Their result is heuristic since it is based on coppersmith's technique for finding small solutions to bivariate modular polynomial equations. However this attack seems to work very well in practice. We sketch the main idea of their attack.
Consider the normal RSA scheme where are balanced and defining equation of the RSA: This means that if or, equivalently if , one can find in time polynomial in the factorization of and consequently break RSA.
Improved Bounds:
The results in last section show that the small inverse problem can be solved when
The bound is derived from the determinant of the lattice which gives an upper bound on the lengths of the shortest vectors of the lattice. In the last section, we compute the determinant of a lattice generated by shifts and powers of Since is full rank and corresponding matrix is triangular, the determinant is just the product of the entries on the diagonal-carefully balanced so that this product is less than 1. Once the approach no longer works, as the product exceeds 1 for every choice of But if the some of the larger terms of this product were removed, we might be able to find greater values of This suggests that one can ignore some rows which have large diagonal values. But unfortunately the resulting lattice is not full rank, and computing its determinant is not so easy. Boneh-Durfee used the strategy called "Geometric progressive matrices" to improve the bound to 0.292. For full details refer [8] .
BLOMER AND MAY'S ATTACK
Blomer and May revisited the above attack. They come up with the bound 0.290. Even though it is worse than Boneh and Durfee's bound, analysis is much simpler than Boneh and Durfee. They begin their analysis by choosing parameters and then construct exactly the same lattice as Boneh and Durfee, before removal the rows with corresponding basis of . Next they remove certain rows of to take an intermediate matrix ̅ Let ̅ be the lattice spanned by ̅ Unlike Boneh-Durfee, they go on removing an equal number of columns in order to obtain a square matrix. As an example, the following matrix corresponds to matrix after removal of certain rows and columns. We denote the final matrix constructed by Blomer Although it yields a weaker bound than Boneh and Durfee method, the new approach followed by Blomer and May has some advantages. They are a) It leads to simple proofs since one deals with square matrices which significantly simplifies determinant calculations. b) It reduces the lattice dimension as a function of and which implies that one can get closer to the theoretical bound. c) It makes use of structural properties of the underlying polynomials which makes possible extension to other lattice constructions using these polynomials.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigate main techniques to derive bound for the secret exponent RSA. Wiener provided the bound 0.25 initially. But later Boneh improved the bound upto 0.292. May proposed another technique which is easy to analysis, but the bound they achieved is 0.290. It is an open problem for RSA, if secret exponent is greater than 0.292 without having the partial knowledge of any parameter. If secret exponent is greater than 0.292, then there is no any current knowledge for RSA security if there is no any partial information about the parameters of RSA cryptosystem.
